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"The wind of change is sweeping throuqh Africa," Harold MacMillJn 
once said in a famous speech he gave after World \.Jar 11. The British 
prime minister was referring to the euphoric rise of African national-
ism at the time and the resolve of Africans to exchange Eurooean Coloni-
alism for self-government and independence. There was no indication 
then that there was soon to occur direct involvement of the military in 
the politics of sub-Saharan Africa. 
A decade later, the military took over in Sudan in November, 1958, 
in what can be said to be an eye-opener. After an interregnum that 
lasted another decade, a flurry of military take-overs occurred spanning 
the length and breadth of sub-Saharan Africa. First was Zaire (Congo 
Kinshasa)--November, 1965; Benin (Dahomey)--December, 1965; Central Afri-
can Republic--January, 1966; Upper Volta--January, 1966; Nigeria--Janu-
ary, 1966, and July, 1967; Ghana--February, 1966, and January, 1967; 
Togo--January, 1967; Sierra Leone--March, 1967; and Congo (Congo Brazza-
ville)--August, 19SC', just to mention a few. The above pattern and trend 




Nigeria has suffered several coups and counter-coups. She has one 
of the worst, if not the worst, record of the phenomenon of mi 1: i tary in-
trusion in politics ln sub-Saharan Africa. Apart from the January 15, 
1966, and July 29, 1967, coups already mentioned above, Nigeria also'ex-
perienced military seizures of power on July 29, 1975, and lately on 
December 31, 1983. This is apart from the abortive coup of February 23, 
1976, and several other rumored-abortive coups. For most of her twenty-
f;~s years as an independent country then, Nigeria has been under mili-
tary rule. At the present time, the military is in power in Lagos. 
Nigeria is in search of a workable system which would facilitate the so-
lution of her pressing problems, namely: 
1. The integration of the numerous ethno-cultural groups within 
the country into a united Nigerian nation, and 
2. Socio-economic development to deliver material prosperity, the 
so-called "good life11 to Nigerians. 
This study will assess what the role of the military, if any, has 
been with respect to aiding and abetting or otherwise hindering the real-
ization of the above needs. 
Thesis and Purpose 
The study will investigate the involvement of the Nigerian military 
in the country 1 s politics from 1966 to 1979. Between 1979 and 1983, the 
civilians were back in power in Lagos and it is too early to assess the 
present military regime; hence our time frame, 1966 to 1979, which also 
forms a "solid block"-period of mi 1 itary rule. 
The study will test the following hypothesis: that the Nigerian 
mi 1 itary has been, by and large, a mere usurper of power in Nigerian pol-
itics and has done very little toward the realization of the two major 
needs mentioned above because of tribalism, disunity, and corruption. 
Analytical Framework and Methodology 
After introducing our subject, we shall proceed to state briefly 
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the history of military involvement in Nigerian politics, in the process 
of which we shall examine the nature of the coups d~etat. This is of ut-
most relevance because Nigeria•s present day integration problems direct-
ly stem from the way and manner the country was created. Also, an exam-
ination of the nature of the military takeovers serves to throw light on 
the real motives of the conspirators and on their performance in office. 
We shall then turn to the thesis of this study and ask the follow-
ing questions: Does the Nigerian military regime concern itself with 
primarily the material well-being of the majority of Nigerians? {An ex-
amination of the budgetary allocations to various government departments 
in comparison to the allocations to the Defense Department should throw 
quite a bit of light here.) How much more natiqnally integrated are the 
ethno-cultural groups within the country since over a decade (1966 to 
1979) of military rule? (Simply put, national integration refers to the 
process of uniting culturally and socially discrete groups and it shall 
be assessed by the degree of sectionalism, ethnicity, tribalism, etc., 
both in the make-up of political parties of the second republic and the 
results of the 1979 general elections.) What is the record of the 
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military in the realm of economic development--economic development here 
simply means self-sufficiency in food production and the adequate provi-
sion of sanitary (tap-borne) water, electricity, and housing? These 
variables were selected because they provide a good measurinq stick of 
how the military has fared with respect to the two great needs of Nigeria 
mentioned above. The performance of the military as measured by the stan-
dards above in turn determine whether they have been mere usurpers of 
power or not. 
The above questions, needless to say, are not mutually exclusive. 
The aim here is to pitch the promises of the military against their per-
formance, not necessarily against the performance of the civilians. For 
the sake of convenience, we shall be dealing with the military as an in-
stitution rather than dealing with individual administrations. The jus-
tification of this approach lies in the fact that there is a congruence 
of not only the principal elements but also of the guiding principles of 
al 1 military regimes during our period of focus (1966 to 1979) and even 
beyond, for example, the regime that assumed power on December 31, 1983. 
This study will employth~ non-quantitative and traditional methodo-
logy of emoirical observation or evaluation. We shall begin by taking a 
cursory look at the territory that has already been covered by available 
literature. 
CHAPTER I I 
REVIEW OF THEORETICAL LITERATURE 
The flurry of coups mentioned previously caught many political ob-
servers by surprise. The surprise was not in the fact of military in-
volvement in politics. Such involvement of the military in the politics 
of developing nations had already occurred in Israel and Turkey, for in-
stance. Rather, because African soldiers had not been squarely behind 
the nationalists during the latter's confrontation with the colonialists 
on the question of independence (with the possible exception of Algeria), 
it was surprising to watch these soldiers carve a political leadership 
role for themselves overnight and so soon after independence. This was 
especially so since a lot of confidence was reposed in the efficacy of 
the Westminster model and other metropolitan models,.and their bright fu-
ture in Africa was assumed. Moreover, the officer-corps of the African 
military had been, and still is, trained in metropolitan military academ-
ies such as Great Britain's Sandhurst, France's St. Cyr, and the United 
States' Fort Gordon. They (African soldiers) had been properly schooled 
in Western European military tradition, which outlines the military's 
role as that of the prosecution of war as declared by its political lead-
ers. They had been taught that the political leadership role was not 
for the military. 
Given the number and importance of the military regimes in the new 
states, scholars have been drawn to study them and the result has been 
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some important systematic and theoretical works on the military 1 s politi-
cal role in particular and civil-military relations in general. Initial-
ly, the dominant orientation toward the subject was that of the 11 Garrison 
State11 model (Lasswell, pp. 455-468) which was in reaction against the 
rise of totalitarian states in Europe in the 1930 1 s. For Lasswell, the 
garrison state is one in which the specialists in violence represent the 
most powerful group in the national decision-making process. Historical 
examples would be Germany (1933 to 1945) and Japan (1930 to 1945). 
After World War I I, the trend moved away from the discussion of the 
Lasswellian model of civil-military relations. One of the first attempts 
since then to set up a theoretical framework of civil-military relations, 
argued, rather too broadly, that the officer corps is a professional body, 
acknowledges a responsibility to society, is expert, possesses a sense of 
corporateness which excludes outsiders and has a distinctive outlook and 
role. According to this view, there are two models of civil-military re-
lations: the objective control model, in which the military is small, 
exclusive, highly professional, indifferent to ideologies, and subject to 
civilian governmental control; and the subjective control model which is 
characterized by the absence of clear lines between civilian and military 
groups and values. The military is said to be integrated into society 
and to support dominant political ideologies and social values (Hunting-
ton, 1957, ~P· 7-18, 80-93). This assessment hardly applies to African 
armies today as will be shown below. 
Generally speaking, the technological developments of this age have 
produced major changes in military establishments, and the revolution in 
military technology has altered the patterns of organizational authority 
in the army. Also, technical innovation has caused a narrowing of skills 
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between the military sector and the civilian sector. This has moved mili-
tary officers into a large managerial and political arena where they tend 
to look beyond purely military affairs and therefore become concerned 
with politics both at home and abroad. Where this is true, and it is not 
true in every case, the officers become politicised and show broad inter-
ests in oolitical, social, and economic subjects (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 22-
75). A prime example of the above is seen in the prominent role played 
by the Soviet military in the Korean jet-liner flight 007 incident re-
cently. Again it must be noted that this is only a general picture. 
Specifically, as it applies to Africa, especially Nigeria, the military 
seized power and then became politicised in the process of exercising it 
and not the other way around. 
The study of the military in politics was furthered by the rise of 
modern comparative politics. This time the studies focused upon the 
role of the military in the politics of developing nations. Among the 
first attempts at a comparative study of the military in modernizing 
states is a work edited by John J. Johnson. The book's theme is to ex-
plore the role of the military in transitional societies. The military 
is considered an effective agent of modernization by most authors in the 
book. 
In the introductory essay, modernization is defined as egalitarian 
democracy, representative government, technological and economic pro-
gress, efficient and honest administration, and national autonomy and 
status in the international system. The essay further states that when 
parliamentary democratic regimes falter, military rule is one of several 
practicable and apparently stable alternatives and that the military 
8 
oligarchy is one of several political forms in the course of political 
development, especially in developing nations (Shils, pp. 9-13). 
The experience of several African states, especially Nigeria, has 
been that one coup has led to another and another--an obviously destabil-
izing state of affairs which clearly has not and cannot foster moderniza-
tion even as defined by Shils. This observation goes for the next essay 
in the Johnson book which argues that the military is the most modern 
and rational organization in the traditional society having been modeled 
after industrial-based organizations and influenced by highly advanced 
Western military technology; that the army contributes to the increase in 
social mobility of the recruits and provides considerable training both 
in technology and citizenship and thus plays a prominent role in the mod-
ernizing process as a powerful modernizing instrument in the transitional 
society (Pye, pp. 78-89). 
At the time the Johnson book appeared in 1962, it could not be rea-
sonably concluded that the military is an effective agent of moderniza-
tion in the new states. This is especially so where sub-Saharan Africa 
one 
is concerned. By 1962, only/coup d~etat had been registered in the re-
gion--the Sudanese coup of November, 1958. Most of the few independent 
states in the area were barely half a decade old as such, with certainly 
no experience of military government. Therefore, one can safely say 
that the Johnson hypothesis under consideration here was hastily arrived 
at to the exent that it affects sub-Saharan Africa. Even given that the 
contributors of the Johnson book were desirous of thoroughly investigat-
ing the general hypothesis of the book, they could not have been able to 
do so for reasons stated immediately above. 
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Since the appearance of the Johnson book, however, enough has been 
seen and observed of the military in politics and military government in 
Africa to enable fairly exhaustive investigations to be carried out in 
this direction and reasonable conclusions arrived at. It is to some of 
these investigations that we shall now turn. 
Far from being a coherent, organized and an efficient organization 
that it is so often pictured as, once an army (African) enters govern-
ment, the possession of power proceeds to divide it: army cohesion dis-
appears as soon as the army stops performing the functions for which it 
was drrlled, hence the incidence of the counter-coup (First, p. 436). 
Once in government, the political neutrality of the military is severely 
tested by the rigors and 11 corruption 11 of political life. In fact, right 
after graduation, the African Sandhurst, St. Cyr or Fort Gordon alumnus 
begins to strive for social and material upward mobility to the detri-
ment, invariably, of service to the army and the state. Involvement in 
politics is for him the surest and most rapid route to achieving social 
and material mobility. 
The entry of soldiers into government worsens the alignment of so-
cial forces in the affected societies because it introduces weapons into 
the conflict. In the Nigerian case, military involvement in the mid-
sixties almost led to the demise of the country rather than blocking dis-
unity and disintegration. As soon as the Nigerian army stepped into the 
turbulence of Nigeria 1 s post-independence politics, the agglomerations 
of interests and social groups that made up the army soaked up the poli-
tical and social conflicts of the day. As a result of the involvement 
of the military, the conflict took a worse turn--civil war. 
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Once the military enters politics, the stability it promised is soon 
broken by the episode of the counter-coup. Within African armies, it is 
not surprising to find acute resentment between different generations of 
officers and fierce rivalry at lower levels. One generation rose through 
the ranks and was promoted at Independence and during the Africanization 
of the colonial armies. The other, which is made up of younger men bet-
ter educated and better trained at intensive officer courses at Sand-
hurst and other metropolitan military academies, consider themselves bet-
ter qualified to command. Frustration and conspiracy therefore flourish. 
This leads to disunity within the army and to the frequent occurrence of 
counter-coups. 
The very seizure of power itself inflicts a profoundly devastating 
blow on the cohesion of the army. A coup d~etat shatters forever, the 
sanction against a military seizure of power. A major-general or a brig-
adier who usurps state power must expect to be emulated by a colonel. 
What one colonel can do, another surely can copy, improve upon, or undo 
(First, p. 437). Indeed, what a colonel can do, a lieutenant-colonel, a 
major, and even a sergeant who is daring can--after all, they also have 
guns and bullets: for example, flight lieutenant Jerry Rawlings of 
Ghana and Sergeant (now General) Samuel Doe of Liberia. The obligation 
of military discipline is thus broken ultimately. 
Possession of power not only divides the army and therefore makes 
it inefficient but it also corrupts it. Regardless of why the army came 
to power, office soon creates an appetite for power and feeds it. The 
old generals tend to grow fond of the ceremonial and perquisites of of-
fice and the young officers enjoy the authority and popular awe in which 
they are held. Compared with life at the State House or the Governor 1 s 
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mansion, in the ministries (government departments) and the diplomatic 
round, life in the Officers• Mess is meager and secluded (First, p. 439). 
Another examination of African armies on the basis of empirical 
realities reveals that African armies are not ••modern corporate hierar-
chies•• but ••autonomons, only quasi-modern, tenuously interlinked, person-
alist pyramids•• clashing over the allocation of promotions, commands, 
and patronage (Decalo, p. 240). The African military, in general, is 
neither more cohesive, nationalist, progressive, nor self-denying than 
the civilian clique toppled (Decalo, p. 36). Therefore, when the mili-
tary assumes political power, it is rarely able to provide an efficient, 
nationally oriented and stable administration, partly because of its own 
cleavages and competitions. Often, considerable time and effort is ex-
pended toward warding off alternative challenges to their authority both 
within the military and outside of it. 
As far as a mission or a sense of direction is concerned, it is ques-
tionable that they (the military) desire to change things for the better. 
The military does not differ, on the whole, in its orientations from the 
civilian regime but is mainly preoccupied with personal and corporate 
aggrandizement (Decalo, p. 24). All the change that the coup--a method 
of change that changes very little--generally brings to affected African 
states is cosmetic and usually comprises only a change in personalities 
and political style and a redistribution of political and economic power 
among the elites with the army getting the lion•s share. The low-income 
and largely agrarian-based economies of African states do not disappear; 
neither are their ethnically split societies consolidated with a wave of 
the gun (Bienen, 1978, p. 18). 
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The African military is not up and doing generally speaking and if 
onewereto measure professionalism not by the statements of individual 
officers nor their verbal commitment to civilian rule but by military 
criteria, for example, demonstrated logistical ability, the maintenance 
of a chain of command,skills developed in combat or engineering prowess, 
one would discover that the level of profession~lism in African armies 
cannot be said to be high (Bienen, 1978, p. 18). In addition to being 
deficient in innately military qualities, the African military lacks the 
political talents requisite for rule in Africa such as sk.ill in dealing 
with political groups via persuasion, flexible policies, and bargaining 
abilities, that is, politiking. It is not equipped to bring stability, 
order, and modernization by overcoming the same problems of ethnicity, 
regionalism and economic stagnation that the civilians confronted. In 
other words, even if the military desired to improve the political and 
social-economic life in an African state, it simply could not because 
it is not equipped to do so. The promises of 11 national reconstruction 11 
drummed by an African mi 1 itary just arrived at the State House arl'! there-
fore, invariably, a garb for how can the military 11 succeed'' where the 
civilians 11failed 11 in what is basically a civilian endeavor? The chances 
of better conditions ensuingc being bleak, the prognosis is consequently 
for political decay and not political development in African states fall-
ing under military control (Welsch, 1~70, p. 229). 
As far as Africa south of the Sahara is concerned, the military in-
tervenes in order to enhance its corporate interests more than those of 
the society in general. Military officers desire promotions and are 
afraid of dismissal. They are interested in adequate (in their defini-
tion) budgetary support and are very mindful of interference in their 
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internal affairs, for example, the promotion of a soldier on the basis 
of loyalty to the President instead of seniority and merit. In a bid to 
compel members of the Ghanaian armed forces to join his Convention Peo-
ples Party (CPP), President Kwame Nkrumah promoted officers loyal to his 
ideology while punishing recalcitrant ones. In 1965, Nkrumah drdered 
the compulsory retirement of the two highest ranking officers because 
they objected to his removal of the Presidential Guard regiment from 
regular army chain of command. In addition to the above, you had are-
duction in the material privileges of the Ghanaian army as General Ocram, 
one of the conspirators, brings out in his memoirs. Ocram said that by 
late 1965, things were tough for most senior army officers; that while 
salaries were worth only a third of their value, the officers were then 
not only to lose their training allowance but also to pay for their elec-
tricity (Nordlinger, pp. 35, 38). This situation played no small part 
in bringinq about the first Ghanaian coup in February, 1966, which top-
pled Nkrumah. 
As far as Nigeria is concerned, it has been pointed out that the lbo 
majors who carried out the first coup in 1966 did so partly because they 
felt that they had or would soon suffer promotional discriminations and 
possibly be forced out of the army to make room for the Hausa-Fulanis 
(Nordlinger, p. 41). The counter-coup which followed shortly after can 
be regarded as the Hausa-Fulani officers 1 answer to the many lbo promo-
tions ordered by Aguiyi lronsi following the January, 1966, coup. 
The martial virtues of the military--for example, bravery, discip-
line, and obedience--have little relevance for the governing of states. 
Pretorians, that is, military officers who become major political actors 
due to their actual or threatened use of force, as governors are as 
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corrupt or more so than their civilian predecessors. Some Nigerians 
feel that the Nigerian military is less corrupt when holding political 
power than Nigerian politicians. This is a fallacy, and a ''per-head 11 
consideration of the matter would reveal that this is so. Because more 
people are needed to run a civilian government than needed for a mili-
tary one and therefore more people have access to government funds in 
the former than in the latter, it appears that the former is, per se, 
more corrupt than the latter. Secondly, very little is known of mili-
tary corruption and one suspects that the actual magnitude of military 
corruption during the latter part of the Gowon regime was unknown to the 
Nigerian 11 in the street. 11 The actual evidence of military transgression 
in this area, and elsewhere, is not easily obtainable and even when ob-
tained is not publicized unlike in the case of civilians. This is be-
cause few journalists want ot risk losing their jobs and being thrown in-
to jail by attempting to expose military corruption in the media which 
is invariably state-owned and controlled. In Nigeria, daring journal-
ists have been thrown into jail after having their heads shaved because 
they criticised the militari government. Also, while a civilian regime 
does not orobe the outgoing military government for fear of a coup, the 
praetorians make ita point of duty to probe the displaced civilians and 
to go out of their way to show that the ousted civilians deserved what 
they got! 
Praetorians do not become governors in order to improve government. 
This is brought out clearly in a survey of 229 coup attempts between 
1946 and 1970, which revealed that only 19 such attempts were motivated 
by any kind of reformist inclinations and only 8 percent of the attempts 
were undertaken to correct economic, political, and social maladies 
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(Nordlinger, p. 86). African military governments usually portray a 
"better than thou" image, particularly during the early part of their 
incumbencies in an attempt to justify their action. They may do such a 
thing as'step-up the payment of external loans taken by their predeces-
sors. Soon, however, the true intentions of the new leaders begin to 
show. The Ghanaian National Liberation Council made substantial cut-
backs in government spending with a lot of hullabaloo after toppling 
Nkrumah. Soon, however, the economically unproductive military budget 
swelled by 40 percent due to pay increases and purchase of Mercedes-
Benz cars for officers. By 1968, two years after the coup, the number 
of expensive status symbols doubled compared to the situation at the 
time of the coup (Nordlinger, P• 128). Although government corruption 
was not unknown in Sudan before 1958, in that year it reached gargantu-
an proportions under the praetorians who took over large plots of re-
stricted public lands, took bribes to grant import licenses, embezzled 
large public sums and then manipulated the judicial process to go scot-
free (Nordlinger, p. 128). 
At the assumption of political office, African military, being sim-
pletons in the exercise of political power, usually ban all political 
parties and outlaw the constitution, naively imagining that they can gov-
ern their complex (though traditional) societies without politiking--a 
case of throwing away the baby with the bathwater. Of course, govern-
ment by decree, not debate, and according to the whims of the military 
rather than popular support soon proves impossible. At this juncture 
the praetorian may become dictatorial, for example, ldi Amin or else in-
volve civi 1 ians at the highest levels as has been the experience of 
Nigeria and Ghana. In this case, and this is particularly true of 
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Nigeria, permanent secretaries (bureaucratic departmental heads) become 
''super permanent secretaries" as a resu 1 t of increased i nf 1 uence through 
advisement. 
In Ghana, the slogan "no politics" initially adopted by the coun-
try's first military regime in 1966 was soon discarded and several anti-
Nkrumah politicians of the outlawed United Party were involved. In Ni-
geria, beginning from the Gowon regime to date, the military government 
has appointed several former top Northern People's Congress (N.P.C.), 
Action Group (AG) and National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) poli-
ticians to high office in an attempt to court popular support. Gowen 
even appointed Obafemi Awolowoas vice-chairman of the Federal Executive 
Committee. This practice demonstrates very loudly that by their own 
self-admission, the military is not equal to the task of governing that 
they assume for themselves by shear force of arms. 
The Ataturk Model 
Turkey under Ataturk is most widely cited as one case in which a 
military oligarchy made fundamental contributions to the social and eco-
nomic development of a developing state. Such citation usually comes 
with the erroneous implication that therefore many more Ataturk-Turkeys 
are obtainable elsewhere, including Africa. 
It should be noted that certain conditions obtained in Turkey when 
Ataturk came to power that do not obtain in Africa today. Turkey was 
underpopulated and culturally homogeneous, had a peasant land-owning 
class that was isolated from urban politics and the country was united 
against foreign enemies. Not only were the conditions obtaining in 
Turkey unique, but Ataturk's style was also unique for a military leader. 
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Unlike what many an African general would do, Ataturk made the moderniza-
tion of the army dependent on the transformation of Turkish society as a. 
whole. Appropriations for national defense decreased from 1926 through, 
the 1930's and it was not until 1939 that it rose to the pre-1926 level 
(Bienen, 1971, p. 16). This undoubtedly made some capital avaiilable for. 
development purposes. On assumption of power, however, African military 
rulers generally "eat" up such a large chunk of the national income that 
economic development is precluded. 
Ataturk insisted that Turkish army officers who wanted to become di-
rectly involved in partisan politics should leave the armed forces, thus 
indicating that civil ian institutions, not military ones, are better 
suited to lead Turkey (and other countries) to modernization. In fact, 
it is questionable that the Ataturk regime was a military, as opposed to 
a civilian one. Ataturk is known to have "civil ianized" himself and his 
regime, for example, his official portrait showed him in white tie and 
tails, not in military regalia. 
Even if the military were capable of making fundamental contribu-
tions to the socio-economic development of African states, that is all 
that the military could possibly do--just aid the socio-economic develop-
ment of African states. This route to modernization is hostile to the 
needs of political institution building which is able to usher in poli-
tical stability and order without which any gains in the socio-economic 
realm cannot be sustained. It is the political party, not the military, 
which can be effectively institutionalized as a ruling force to bring 
about political institution bul !ding. 
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The Origins of Military Intervention 
There are several approaches to the study of military intervention 
in politics. Some seek the causes of military intervention in the char-
acteristics of the military establishment. Such authors say that the 
ability and propensity of military officers to intervene in politics is 
related to their control of physical power, their"ethos of public ser-
vice," their skill structure, which ••combines managerial ability with a 
heroic posture,•• their internal cohesion and their middle and lower mid-
dle class social origins (Janowitz, 1964, pp. 1-74). Most of these char-
acteristics, however, do not describe African armies as we noted above. 
Janowitz distinguishes the military careers into two types: 11prescribed 11 
and ••adoptive•• careers. The former refers to the career of the officer 
who has ordinary military assignments and education but no special as-
signments while the latter means, on the other hand, that the affected 
officer has unique educational or political-military assignments. Jano-
witz argues that those officers who belong to the latter category have 
broader knowledge on social and economic matters and become more politi-
cal while those officers of the former category tend to be less politi-
cal and uninvolved in politics. Officers who received overseas military 
education tend to be more interested in domestic politics (Janowitz, pp. 
44-63). The more cohesive the military officers are, the greater abil-
ity to intervene in politics they could have. Cohesion, the feeling of 
group solidarity and the capacity for collective action, conditions the 
political behavior of the officers. Lack of cohesion leads to unstable 
and fragmented involvement and to a high possibility of counter-coups 
after the seizure of power (Janowitz, pp. 67-74). 
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Others look for the causes of military intervention in politics in 
the political and institutional structure of the society rather than in 
the social and organizational characteristics of the military establish-
ment. Such authors link military intervention to the political culture 
of a country by which they mean the strength of the ••political formula 11 
sustaining the rules of political conduct, the extent of popular consen-
sus supporting civilian institutions, and the degree of public involve~ 
ment in, and attachment to, civilian supremacy over the military. They 
argue that the more solidly established civilian supremacy is the less 
likely are the opportunities that the military will seek to intervene in 
politics. From this proposition, political culture is classified into 
four different types: 11mature, 11 11developed, 11 11 low, 11 and 11minimal 11 pol i-
tical culture. These four types of political culture are deter~ined by 
the following three criteria: (1) the legitimacy of the procedures for 
transferring power; (2) the degree of organization of the public; and 
(3) the existence of a wide public recognition as to who or what consti-
tures the sovereign authority. Where all these conditions are fulfilled 
the level of political culture is said to be high and to the extent that 
they are not, it is correspondingly low. 
The characteristic form of military intervention in a 11mature poli-
tical culture11 is said to take the form of 11 influence 11 ; in a 11developed 
political culture11 it is 11 blackmail 11 ; in a 11 low political culture11 it is 
11displacement 11 of some civil ian leaders by others regarded more favor-
able to military interests; and in a 11minimal political culture11 it is 
11supplement 11 of civilians by the military regimes (Finer, pp. 87-163). 
Like Finer, Huntington seeks the causes of military intervention· in 
politics in the political structure of the society. According .to him, 
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the most important causes of military intervention in politics are not 
military but political because military interventions are only one speci-
fie manifestation of a broader phenomenon in underdeveloped societies, 
that is, the general politicization of social forces and institutions--
1957, 
"praetorian politics" (Huntington,/p. 194). He argues that the causes 
of military intervention in politics lie not in the nature of the mili-
tary establishment but in the absence of effective political institu-
tions capable of mediating, refining, and moderating group political ac-
tion. He distinguishes the coups in the praetorian politics into three 
types: the governmental coup or palace revolution; the revolutionary 
coup; and the reform coup. The governmental coup, he says, is a change 
in the top leadership of the government without significant changes in 
the social structure or political institutions. The revolutionary coup 
implies fundamental changes not only in the governmental authority but 
also in the social and economic structure. The reform coup falls some-
where between these two. It takes place to effect reforms in the poli-
tical, social, and economic structure of the affected society (Hunting-
1957 
ton,/pp. 71-98). 
Africa South of the Sahara 
As far as sub-Saharan Africa is concerned--Nigeria included, of 
course--ti-Je above is but a plethora of plausible causation of coups d~etat. 
Some explanations of coups which run the whole gamut from factors endo-
genous to the military to exogenous factors down to personality: factors 
have not been very rewarding either. 
The size of the armed forces of sub-Saharan African states is often 
cited as a cause of coups d~etat. In actual fact this may not be so, 
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because Nigeria and the Central African Republic with armies numbering 
250,000 and 1,100, respectively, as of 1977 have each experienced coups. 
Primordial factors have also been cited as a cause for coups in sub-
Saharan Africa. We know, however, that ·somalia, which is characterized 
by ethnic/cultural homogeneity, Burundi by ethnic/cultural polarization, 
Benin and Zaire by ethnic/cultural fragmentation, have each had military 
regimes. 
Another reason for coups that is often cited is the poor economies 
of most of these states. Yet Libya and Upper Volta, with differing eco-
nomies, have both experienced military dictatorships. The economy of 
the former is comparatively buoyant with a per capita GNP of $1,500. The 
latter has a GNP of only $40. This discrepancy weakens the economic ar-
gument. 
Then there is the contagion rule or the so-called demonstration or 
domino-effect by which it is meant that a military take-over in country 
11A11 will lead to a similar incident in neighboring country 11 B. 11 This is 
often cited in the case of military intervention in Nigerian and Ghanai-
an politics. Two situations contradict this reasoning. Though bounded 
by Ghana, Upper Volta and Mali--all of which have experienced coups--the 
Ivory Coast has had none. Also, Tanzania has not experienced a military 
coup d~etat though bounded by Zaire and Uganda, both of which have. 
The above represent some of the varying ways of looking at:the pheno-
menon of military involvement in politics. Maybe there is a necessity 
for a shift in scholarly emphasis away from the study of 11 the coup 
d~etat, 11 that is, their 11Whys and Wherefores,•• to the study of military 
regimes and their performance. It is not being suggested here that the 
study of military intervention, especially in Africa, cease forthwith, 
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but rather that serious case studies of the performance of military re-
gimes in Africa be embarked upon. This thesis represents a step in this 
direction singling for examination the role that the Nigerian military 
has played in the country's 24-year history as an independent political 
entity, especially during the period 1966 to 1979. We shall begin this 
examination by briefly outlining the history of military involvement in 
Nigerian politics (1966 to 1979). 
CHAPTER I I I 
BRIEF HISTORY OF MILITARY INVOLVEMENT IN 
NIGERIAN POLITICS (1966-1979) 
Nigeria, the most populous state in Africa, the richest and most 
powerful in black Africa, was a creation of British, French, and German 
colonial rivalries and ambition in \-/est Africa. 
Until 1900, Nigeria existed as a number of independent national 
states with linguistic and cultural differences. She was a collection 
of ''independent native states separated from one another ... by great 
distances, differences. in history and traditions, and by ethnological, 
racial, tribal, political, social and religious barriers" (Obasanjo, p. 
1). In 1900, the British, who had gained an upperhand in the European 
"Scramble for Africa" as far as the territory now referred to as Nigeria 
is concerned, created the Protectorates of Northern and Southern Nigeria. 
These protectorates were separate, distinct, autonomous, and each 
directly responsible to the Colonial Office in London. A most momentous 
step in the political evolution of Nigeria as a modern state was taken 
on January 1, 1914, with the amalgamation of the two protectorates. De-
spite this, the orotectorates were still administered as separa'te enti-
ties. 
Indirect rule was instituted over most of the territory of Northern 
Nigeria. It was agreed that the Colonial Office would not interfere with 
the religion of the people (Islam) and therefore the activities of 
23 
24 
\~estern European missionaries would be restricted only to the non-moslem 
areas of the north. The Emirs wanted to maintain the status-quo and 
therefore their dominant positions. As for the British, the Christian 
missions had brouqht with them modern Western education which had given 
the people of the South ''dangerous" ideas which may lead them to demand 
for the "vote" and self-government, it was feared. The "quarantine" of 
the North was intended to stop these "dangerous" ideas from spreading 
and possibly "catching on." On the other hand, rule through the local 
authorities, the Emirs, facilitated good administration and was inexpen-
sive. 
In 1923, a Nigerian Consultative Council was created and a few Ni-
gerians were given the chance to air their views on the colonial govern-
ment's legislative agenda, but this was exclusively limited to the South. 
The political changes in other parts of the British Empire at this time 
helped to hasten Nigeria's constitutional development. 
In 1933, three regions--Northern, Western, and Eastern--were creat-
ed and in 1946, a constitution which provided for regional assemblies in 
the regions and for a House of Chiefs each in the Western and Northern 
regions was adopted. These assemblies did not make law. The preroga-
tive of law-makinq lay with a central legislature which was made up by 
designated colonial officials and representatives of the regions. It 
was~ the first time the North and the South were legislatively integrated. 
Following another wave of political awareness in the colonial terri-
tories, this time after World War I I, regional delegates met to revise 
the 1946 constitution and came up with a new one in 1951. By then re-
gional political parties had already been formed--the Northern Peoples 
Congress (NPC) in the North, the Action Group (AG) in the West, and the 
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National Counci 1 of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) in the East. The 1951 con-
stitution strengthened regional autonomy, for example, it gave the re-
gional assemblies the authority to make laws for the regions. A new con-
stitution adopted in 1954 further strengthened regional autonomy. The 
trend continued all through the constitutional conferences held in 1954, 
1957, 1958, 1959, and 1960. 
At independence, regionalism became the bane of national unity in-
stead of ensuring and preserving it. There was a diffusion instead of 
a fusion of the three units. Additionally, there was the problem of the 
lop-sided nature of the political (structural) division of the country, 
the existing Federal Constitution, and the spirit in which it was operat-
ed and the ill-fitting form of government--the parliamentary party sys-
tem. 
Burke defines a party as 11a body of men united for promoting, by 
their joint endeavours, the national interest based upon some particular 
principle in which they are all agreed 11 (Okpaku, p. 15). The parliamen-
tary party system assumes a national arena in which the national interest 
is known but in which groups differ as to the means of achieving the 
ends. Such groups may form parties and seek office. While in office, 
their duty is to carry out the national mandate faithfully. Groups which 
at the moment are not in office because their proposals are only accepta-
ble to a minority of the population become the people 1 s watchdogs (the 
opposition party). 
A national arena such as Britain 1 s where the national interest is 
agreed on is good ground for the success of the parliamentary party sys-
tem. But when this concept is transferred to a society still in flux--
such as Nigeria was in the late fifties and sixties and possibly still 
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is--where the national interest is still in the process of definition, 
there are difficulties to say the least (Okpaku, p. 81). Political con-
I 
test becomes a contest to define the goals to be sought by society. Con-
flicts tend to be chaotic and politics becomes a 11 zero-sum11 game. Par-
ties seek means to 11 bend 11 the constitution to further particular (parti-
san) ends and parliament, rather than being the institution where the 
national logic or idea is abstracted from the numerous and partially or-
ganized demands from the political system, becomes the arena of power 
where the temporary majority superimposes its will upon the general will. 
Immense chaos invariably ensues. Nigeria was not an exception. 
The first federal elections to be held in Nigeria since independence 
were held in 1964 between the NPC/Nigerian National Democratic Party 
(NNDP) alliance called the Nigerian National Alliance (NNA) and the AG/ 
NCNC alliance called the United Progressive Grand Alliance (UPGA). All 
kinds of devices were used to eliminate opponents in the regions, thugs 
were hired to stop opponents from campaigning. In November of 1965, 
elections into the Western Regional House were held. Again massive rig-
ging more brazen than had occurred the previous year was employed. Law 
and order broke down completely, leading to an almost complete state of 
anarchy. 
In the small hours of the morning of January 15, 1966, the soldiers 
struck. To all intents and purposes, it was an lbo coup. It was led by 
an lbo and the casualty was all but non-lbo. Nigeria had been in tur-
moil but the involvement of the military, especially the method (fire-
arms) and style (tribal chauvinism) of such involvement, put it in an 
even graver situation. Nzeogu and his group of Majors had reportedly 
hoped to 11establish a strong, unified and prosperous nation free from 
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corruption and internal strife11 but power fell into the hands of an 11un-
prepared 11 Aguiyi lronsi (also an lbo) who came out of a social party to 
become Nigeria 1 s head of state. 
The way lronsi handled the affairs of state tended to confirm the 
fear of the North that the coup was a hegemonic design of the lbos to 
rule the country. lronsi was nepotic and he failed to try the 'coup plot-
ters. He unilaterally effected promotions within the army in which 80 
I 
percent of the beneficiaries were lbo and appointed these officers as 
prefects of the provinces he had just created then (Dudley, p. 180). Re-
sentment grew in the North, culminating in the May, 1966, riots which 
broke out in Northern towns during which many lbos were killed while 
others fled back to the East. 
On July 29, 1966, Northern army officers staged a counter-coup, kill-
ing lronsi and other lbo officers. Again power fell in the hands of one 
who had not prepared to exercise it--Yakubu Gowon. Odumegwu Ojukwu, a 
surviving lbo officer and then military governor of the East--the post 
he had been appointed to by lronsi--refused to submit to federal govern-
ment authority. On May 26, 1967, a meeting of the Eastern Regional Con-
sultative Assembly empowered Ojukwu to lead the East out of Nigeria in 
secession. On May 27, 1967, Gowon declared a state of emergency before 
Ojukwu could implement the mandate he had been given, assumed full pow-
ers and divided Nigeria into twelve states. 
Ojukwu refused to recognize the twelve-state structure and declared 
the Eastern Region the independent Republic of Biafra. The die was cast. 
Both sides increased their military arsenal and moved troops to the 11 bor-
der.•• A bloody and costly civil war ensued beginning on July 6, 1967, 
for thirty months. 
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Five years after the end of the civil war, Gowan was hims~lf ousted 
from power in 1975 by the same clique that had 1 iterally put him in power 
and was succeeded by General Murtala Mohammed who was assassinated in an 
attempted coup in February, 1976. Olusegun Obasanjo took over as Head 
of State until October 1, 1979, when the civilians were handed power. 
Thus, though Nigeria had been in turmoil prior to 1967, as a result 
of the intrusion of the military in Nigerian politics, not as a corporate 
entity but along ethnic and sectional lines and the introduction of fire-
arms, the political conflict within the country took on ominous dimen-
sions. A civil war was fought which led to the near demise of Nigeria 
altogether. 
Within only a decade (1967 to 1976) Nigeria had had four military 
governments--a highly destabilizing phenomenon. What is more, only one 
(Murtala) of the four heads of governments had premeditated occupying 
the highest office of the land and therefore could possibly have been 
ready to effectively discharge the duties of the office. The other three 
had had political power literally thrust at them--a situation which lends 
itself to inefficiency. It is little wonder then that the military was 
ineffective. 
Having briefly outlined the history of military intrusion in Nigeri-
an politics, let us proceed to examine their performance once they arriv-
ed on the political scene. As stated above, the examination shall be on 
the basis of their (military) performance vis a vis the two crucial prob-
,, 
lems facing Nigeria: national integration and economic development. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION 
The term 11 integration11 is used to cover an extraordinarily large 
range of political phenomena. Generally speaking, 11 integration 11 has to 
do with that which holds a society or a political system together. Spe-
cifically, however, one can talk of five types of 11 integration 11 1: nation-
1 
al, territorial, value, elite-mass integration, and integrative behavior 
I 
(Weiner, p. 180). Here we are concerned with the foremost type', that is, 
11national integration. 11 
National integration refers to the process of uniting or bringing 
together culturally and socially discrete groups within a territorial 
unit and the establishment of a national identity among such groups 
(Weiner, p. 180). The use of the term presupposes that one is dealing 
with an ethnically or otherwise plural society such as Nigeria in which 
every group (tribe) is characterized by its own language, customs, or 
other self-conscious cultural qualities. National integration therefore 
refers specifically to the issue of creating a sense of territorial na-
tionality which overshadows or eliminates subordinate parochial (tribal) 
regional loyalties. 
When successfully effected, national integration leads to the crea-
tion of a 11 nation, 11 for example, the cases of Italy and the United States. 
No agreement exists as to the perfect definition of the term 11 nation. 11 




lists constituent elements of the nations that are known in su~h a way 
as to distinguish them satisfactorily from other types of communities in 
i 
which men live without opening up a Pandora•s box of leaky 11 if~ 11 and 
11buts. 11 However, we define 11 nation 11 here, like Emerson does, as a com-
1 
munity of people who belong together in terms of a common heritage and 
fee 1 1 ike they have a common future. It is the 1 argest entity which 
when the 11 chips are down 11 effectively commands men 1 s loyalty over and 
above the claims of lesser communities within it or those communities 
which cut across it or encompass it (Emerson, p. 95). 
The first political question for every African so-called 11 nation 11 
is whether it is indeed one. Each African country could be ripped apart 
by tribal jealousies and all are weakened by them. This problem is 
shared by all new states with the exception of the first new siate--the 
United States. It is, however, particularly acute in Africa where most 
of the newest of states are. 
By her very size--twice as populous as any African country--Nigeria 
faces a greater oroblem in the area under discussion than most African 
countries. She conglomerates not just more people per se but more eth-
nic (tribal) groupings than any African country. Estimates of the num-
ber of distinct languages (which means ethnic groups) as opposed to dia-
lects in Nigeria are usually from 150 to 248 (Schwawz, p. 1). The three 
major ethnic groups--the 11big three 11--are the Hausa-Fulani in Northern 
Nigeria, the Yoruba in Western Nigeria, and the lgbo in Eastern Nigeria. 
A word or two about the 11 big three 11 at this point wi 11 be in order as it 
would shed some light on the plurality of Nigeria. 
The Hausa-Fulani inhabit most of Northern Nigeria. Besides them 
there are the Nupe, Tiv, Kanuri, and several other tribes. They are 
mostly muslim and are the least literate in the Western script (though 
literate in Arabic) of the three. The Hausa-Fulani were suspicious of 
I 
the more educated Yoruba and lgbo and were therefore not enthusiastic 
about early independence or a centralized Nigerian government. 
31 
The lqbo who live in Eastern Nigeria with among several others--the 
ljaw, lbibio, Efik, and Ekoi--are traditionally a highly individualistic 
people with no political chiefaincies and no politically conceived hier-
archical structures. They are noted for their strong kinship ties to 
one another and are mostly Christian. 
The Yoruba live in Western Nigeria with minorities such as the Bini, 
ltsekiri, and the Urhobo. They are a mixed ethnic group religiously. 
There were among the Yoruba subtribal unions with a long history of con-
flicts, especially during the precolonial slave trade era. These con-
flicts have continued today in different forms and on a much reduced 
scale. 
In addition to the sharp ethnic disparities between Nigerian ethnic 
groups, there are religious differences and differences in the impact of 
Western civilization. Southern Nigeria is mostly Christian because it 
was profoundly influenced by Western civilization (through the activities 
of European Christian missionaries) during the colonial era unlike the 
mostly Islamic North. 
Nigerian peoples still live in their ethnic homelands and are not 
geographically intermixed, generally speaking. Members of ethnic groups 
reside in their ancestral territory where few members of other ethnic 
groups live; therefore, the possibility of reducing inter-triba1 differ-
ences through the contact of the various ethnic groups is severely limit-
ed. The Nigerian experience is unlike the Italian or American experience. 
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Italy, once a mere geographical expression, is today a nation due to the 
unifying advantage of a common religious faith (Roman Catholicism) and a 
common language. Those who came to the colonies left their ho~elands. 
Though they may have brought their langauges and customs with them, by 
I 
leaving their homelands they had abandoned one set of loyalties and could 
easily develop another. Thus today, one can speak of a United 'states na-
tion. 
One of Nigeria 1 s greatest needs is that the different tribes become 
but strands woven together to form one whole and her greatest danger is 
the outbreak of tribal jealousies which could cut whatever similitude of 
ties that presently hold the Nigerian people together (Schwarz, p. 1). 
The high degree of ethnic pluralism and heterogeneity characteristic of 
Nigeria provides the societal backdrop for the concurrent problems of 
national integration and economic growth that face Nigeria today. We 
shall take up the problem of national integration presently and that of 
economic development shall be looked at in the latter part of this study. 
British Colonial ism and National 
Integration in Nigeria 
British rule in India is said to have led to the maintenance of law 
and order, administrative unity, the introduction of a common body of 
social and political concepts and values, English as a lingua franca, 
and fiscal and economic integration which served to link together the 
heterogeneous elements which make up Indian society (Emerson, p. 123). 
The net impact of British colonialism in Nigeria is probably the direct 
opposite of the Indian experience. The British can be justifiably ac-
cused of creating Nigeria 1 s national integration problems. 
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There is nothing natural about the borders of the British jcreation 
--Nigeria--except the Southern Atlantic coastline. The artificiality of 
the original amalgam of ethnic groups to form Nigeria resulted :1n a 
grossly unbalanced federal structure distinguished by extreme levels of 
ethnic pluralism. One region--Northern Nigeria--enjoyed not only numeri-
cal but also 9eographical (size) superiority against the other two re-
glens--Western and Eastern Nigeria--put together. 
The colonial regime in Nigeria was unconcerned with the development 
of national (Nigerian) loyalties but interested in creating groups of 
people who would be loyal to its interests. The development of national 
loyalties represented a threat to the interests of the British. Very 
limited popular participation in the affairs of state was allowed. The 
particular sentiments of a ••John Citizen•• hardly ever entered into the 
making of any significant decisions. At independence, when a greater 
measure of public participation was suddenly permitted therefore, the in-
tegrat ion requirements of the ••system•• sky-rocketed overnight--so to say. 
••once educational policy [was to be] determined by national not colonial 
needs, the issues of language policy, location of facilities, the levels 
of educational investment and the question of who bears the cost of edu-
cation all affected the relations of [the] culturally discreet groups 
[in Nigeria]•• (Weiner, p. 184). 
The peculiar colonial policies and constitutional formulas.were such 
that each of the 11 big three•• became a core majority in a three region 
arrangement where each constituted the dominant political party. Politi-
cally, Nigeria had three one-party regions and could have been more ap-
propriately described then as a ••three-one-party system•• than a ••one-
three-party system.•• 
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The inteqration of the various heterogeneous segments of Nigeria 
was never the intention of the colonizers. This was abundantly demon-
strated in their adoption of the policy of Indirect Rule which is rule 
by proxy. Though expedient to begin with, Indirect Rule became a fetish 
and was abortively applied in Eastern Nigeria as noted above. The natu-
ral political course of Indirect Rule was toward the evolution of anum-
ber of distinct tribal states. Indirect Rule depended on the mainten-
ance of the status-quo of traditional authority which in turn depended 
upon keeping tribes apart and maintaining differing tribal customs. It 
11 supported the most conservative elements who were least likely to have 
a horizon wider than the tribe. Its legacy for independent Nigeria has 
been to delay and make more difficult the process of national integra-
tion'' (Swartz, p. 33). The North was sheltered from the foreign influ-
ences that were affecting the South and Southerners and Northerners were 
isolated from each other by official policy. Obstacles were placed in 
the path of Christian missions that wished to establish schools in the 
North. Secular education was equally neglected in the Islamic North 
with the exception of a few efforts like the Katsina Teacher Training 
College. It was feared that modern education (secular and nonsecular) 
would undermine the muslim faith and the local traditional authority and 
ultimate the structure of Indirect ~ule. 
As a result of the colonial educational policy, the peoples of the 
North fell far behind the Southerners in the acquisition of modern skills. 
In 1952, only two percent of persons more than six years old in Northern 
Nigeria were literate in the Roman script--5.4 percent were literate in 
Arabic. In fact, Sokoto, Kano, and Bornu areas had only one percent 
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literacy in the Hestern script. On the other hand, there was 16 and 18 
percent literacy in the Roman script in the Eastern and Wester~ regions, 
respectively. In 1961, the North, with a larger population thJn that of 
! 
both the Eastern and Western regions put together had only 6,487 stu-
dents in secondary school as opposed to 25,908 and 127,751 for the other 
regions, respectively (Swartz, p. 34). The ratio in these figures have 
remained more or less the same today. Northern backwardness as briefly 
discussed above and for which the British are partially responsible is 
one of the basic causes of tension between the North and South in Nigeria 
today. 
The British authorities encouraged the local authorities in the North 
to isolate the Southerners who came into the North as government employ-
ees because there were too few educated Northerners to fill government 
vacancies. The Southerners were therefore isolated in separate areas 
called 11 Sabon Garis 11 or 11 new towns. 11 Northerners were discouraged from 
going to the more radical South. No Northerner sat in the legislative 
counci 1 established under the 1922 Clifford Constitution, for example. 
Jnspite of the 1914 Amalgamation, Northern and Southern Nigeria con-
tinued to have separate administrations as mentioned above. The loyalty 
of the British Colonial officers to their particular regions of assign-
ment was so intense that it was believed that they (officers) could go 
to war against each other in support of their places of assignment. This 
attitude coupled with general British policy enunciated above in brief 
no doubt encouraged similar attitudes between and among Nigerians. This 
probably explains why the leader of the NPC, Ahmadu Bello, declined to 
leave his premiership of the Northern Region and become Prime Minister 
of Nigeria in 1960 because he would have had to live in the Federal Capi-
tal, Lagos. 
36 
Furthermore, though Nigeria did not evolve as an organic political 
entity, the British left her with full formal structures of government 
and administration, a national anthem, a flag, political parties, and 
all the trappings of sovreignty. The cart was put before the horse! The 
institutional apparatus and symbols of statehood preceded the achieve-
ment of nationhood. Underneath lay contradictions, cleavages, and cen-
trifugal forces which prevented the growth of truly national sentiments. 
About the only positive thing that can be said about British Colon-
ialism in Nigeria vis a vis other areas (East Africa) with reference to 
the issue of the national integration of the conglomerations of ethnic 
groups it called Nigeria is the absence of a settler population either 
of Europeans or an Asian lower middle class. (This is not to say that a 
country with a racial mixture is unfortunate. It is to say that the 
problem of national integration in Nigeria would have been comp~unded if 
she had a settler population.) But even in this case, British Colonial-
ism cannot take all the credit. The lack of a settler population was 
partially caused by the fact that Nigeria was unhealthy due to the dead-
ly bite of the ubiquitous mosquito. Also, there was not found land as 
suitable for settlement, climate-wise, as the low-temperature hlighlands 
of East Africa (Kenya) for example. 
I 
The problem of national integration in Nigeria may have been made a 
' I 
little easier by the absence of a settler population but it is ~till 
quite a job. The building of a nation out of a multitude of tribes--
each with different languages and traditions--brought together indiscri-
minately by an alien power, with the tribal differences reinforced by 
religious and educational differences is quite a job. This then is the 
job which the military self-appointed themselves to carry out. 
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The Military and National Integration of Nigeria 
The "majors coup 11 was supposedly carried out to "establish a strong, 
i 
unified and prosperous nation free from corruption and internal strife." 
However, an examination of the mechanics and results of the January, 
1966, coup shows its alleged motivation to have been a garb. The coup 
was an exercise in tribalism and nepotism as noted above. It was led by 
an lgbo, the casualty was all but non-lgbo, and the inerhitor of power 
was lgbo and his actions in office prove that the lgbo were about to put 
into effect a grand hegemonic design to dominate Nigeria. One of such 
actions needs recounting here. Having decided to turn Nigeria into a 
unitary state, the military under lronsi appointed two commissions--a 
Constitutional Review Commission headed by Chief Rotimi Williams and an 
Administrative Review Commission headed by a sole commissioner, Mr. F. 
Nwokedi, an lgbo. Mr. Nwokedi was single-handedly to determine the feas-
ibility of "integrating" the federal and regional public services into a 
single unified service. It is notable that before the Williams Commis-
sian could really start deliberations--deliberations whose end result 
would delineate the work of Mr. Nwokedi, the latter submitted his re~ort 
and the military preceded to announce what one can justifiably call pre-
meditated fundamental political and administrative changes in Nigeria. 
The fact that the murderous majors were not tried coupled with nega-
-
tive reactions to the decreed changes made by Aguiyi lronsi led to the 
Jul'y, 1967, coup and ultimately to the civil war and almost to the actual 
dismemberment of Nigeria as she is known today. Thus, the dire problem 
of national integration facing Nigeria which had manifested itself many 
times since_independence in October, 1960, got worse with military in-
volvement in Nigerian politics. 
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It has been said that the creation of twelve states out of the three 
former regions in Nigeria in 1967 '~ill likely stand as the armed forces 
major contribution to Nigerian politics (integration)"--that the exer-
cise meant a disintegration of the parts to integrate the whol~ (1;/elsch, 
I 
p. 135). An examination of the circumstances that led to the creation 
of states in 1967, however, would reveal that much of the credit for the 
exercise belongs elsewhere--not to the military. 
The main reason for creating states in 1967 was to enforce military 
discipline. In other words, states were not created in order to inte-
grate the country. Ojukwu as Military Governor of the East--an appoint-
ment that lronsi had made--had ceased to attend meetings of the Supreme 
' 
' Military Counci 1 because he refused to accept subordination under Gowan, 
the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. The creation of states was 
to bring Ojukwu down on his knees by pre-empting the mandate he had just 
received from the Eastern Nigerian Consultative Assembly to secede from 
Nigeria. 
In any case, the idea of creating more states was not something the 
military introduced. Long since before independence, minority movements 
had arisen in the regions that made up Nigeria. The minoritieslwithin 
! 
these regions wanted regions of their own where they would be free from 
I 
the domination of the "big three." The minorities in the Western region 
under the leadership of Chief Denis Osadebay agitated for the creation 
of a Mid-West region. Eyo Ita was leader of the minority region in East-
ern Nigeria and the demand was for the creation of a Calabar-Ogoja-Rivers 
region while Joseph Taka led the demand for the creation of a Middle Belt 
region out of the Northern region. Agitations for new regions came to a 
head at the 1957 London Constitutional Conference (LCC). The fifteen 
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requests which were put forward were referred to a Minorities Commission. 
At the 1958 LCC the report of the Minorities Commission which was against 
the creation of states was tabled and discussed but shelved in!favor of 
independence talks. The issue of state-creation was only shelved, not 
! 
satisfied, and requests for more states continued to be made all through 
the first republic. 
Furthermore, in the first half of the Second Republic, Nigeria had 
five political parties: Peoples Redemption Party (PRP), National Party 
of Nigeria (NPN), Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN), Nigeria Peoples Party 
(NPP), and Great Nigeria Peoples Party (GNPP). Three of the above repre-
sented a resustication of the former three dominant political parties in 
Nigeria. The UPN was a resustication of the AG, the NPN of the NPC, and 
the NPP of the NCNC. The PRP was a resustication of the Northern Ele-
ments Prooressive Union (NEPU) which was an opposition party in the Nor-
thern Region during the first republic and was based in Kana. Only the 
GNPP could not be clearly identified historically as having roots in the 
first republic though its founder and financier was a cabinet minister 
in Balewa 1 s government. All five political parties, however, drew most 
of their support in specific ethnic-geographical parts of the country 
during the 1979 general elections. The UPN drew most of its support 
from the states corresponding to the former Western Region, the NPN to 
the former Northern Region, and the NPP to the former Eastern Region. 
The PRP drew its support from Kano and Kaduna states and the GNPP from 
the Kanuri ethnic group located at the North Eastern part of the coun-
try--Waziri being a Kanuri (see Tables I and I 1). The few exceptions to 
the above rule were the performance of the NPN in Rivers and Cross-Rivers 
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TABLE I 
1979 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS D I STR I BUTI ON 
OF SEATS: STATE ASSEMBLIES 
c Tota 1 State Seats GNPP UPN NPN PRP NPP 
Anambra 87 13 --.,.. 73 
Bauchi 60 9 45 2 4 
Bende 1 60 34 22 4 
Benue 57 6 48 3 
Borne 72 59 11 2 
Cross-River 84 16 7 58 3 
Gongola 63 25 18 15 4 
lmo 90 2 9 79 
Kaduna 99 10 3 64 16 6 
Kane 138 3 1 11 12~ 
Kwara 42 2 15 25 
Lagos 36 36 
Niger 30 2 28 
Ogun 36 36 
On do 66 65 1 
Oyo 126 117 9 
Plateau 48 3 10 35 
Rivers 42 1 26 15 
So keto 111 19 92 
Total 1347 157 333 487 144. 226 
% Seats 100 11.7 24.7 36.2 10.7 16.8 
Source: B. Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and Po 1 it i cs 
(Bloomington, 1982)' p. 205. 
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TABLE II 
1979 GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS: 
PARTY CONTROL OF STATES 
GNPP UPN NPN PRP NPP 
Borno Bende I Bauchi Kano Anambra 
Gongola Lagos Benue lmo 
Ogun Kaduna Plateau 





Source: B. Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government and 
Po 1 it i cs (Bloomington, 1982) ' p. 205. 
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and the NPP in Plateau state. Only the NPN came near to qualifying as a 
truly national party. 
The above picture of the 1979 elections is so similar to the results 
of the federal elections in the first republic that there is hardly any 
difference to be found between the two. The fact that things have re-
mained more or less the same after over a decade of military rule clear-
ly shows that they failed to make good concerning their self-appointed 
task to integrate Nigeria. 
When the military intruded into Nigerian politics in 1966, they pro-
mised not only to "establish ... a unified. 11 nation but also a 
"prosperous" one. We have already seen that they failed in the first 
task. We shall now turn our attention to the second task the military 
set for themselves in an area which has been noted above as one of Ni-
geria's two most pressing problems. 
The Problem of Economic Development 
"Economic development" is here simply defined as the provision of 
the material well-being of the people of Nigeria. Nigeria belongs to 
that group of countries variously referred to as "underdeveloped," "de-
veloping," "Group of 77, 11 etc. in international economic jargon. How to 
marshall her resources and provide material well-being to her citizens 
is one of Nigeria's main problems. 
In Gross National Product (GNP) terms, excluding Egypt and South 
Africa, Nigeria is the wealthiest African state with a GNP estimated in 
1974 at $22.4 billion. According to the same estimates, Nigeria, how-
ever, ranks as follows out of a select group of 18 African states with 
reference to the following indices of social welfare (see Table I I 1). 
TABLE Ill 
NIGERIA'S RANK IN PROVISION OF SOCIAL \4ELFARE 
OUT OF A SELECT GROUP OF 
18 AFRICAN STATES 
lndice of Social Welfare 
I. School age children (5-19 years) 
per teacher 
2. Per capita expenditure on health 
3. Population per physician 
4. Infant mortality rate, i.e., deaths 
under one year per one thousand live 
births 








Source: B. Dudly, Nigerian Government and Politics (Blooming-
ton, 1982), p. 226. 
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Economic planning began in Nigeria with the 1962-1968 National De-
velopment Plan (NDP) which was formulated with aid from United States 
economic consultants. Before then, there was the "Ten Year PlJn of De-
' 
velopment and Welfare" of 1946 and the "Economic Program" of the federal 
and regional governments of 1955-1960--all of which could not be classi-
fied as economic plans. They lacked set goals and were not even consis-
tent. The former was an attempt of the British Colonial office to help 
re-activate the Nigerian economy after World War I I, while the latter 
was merely a shopping list of the four regional governments. 
The Military and Economic Development of Nigeria 
The military took over the implementation of the 1962-1968 plan in 
1966 whenthey intruded in Nigerian politics. As a resultofthe outbreak 
of the civil war from 1967 to 1970, all efforts were geared toward the 
' prosecution of war during those years. The first NDP developed under 
the military therefore was the 1970-1974 plan, hereinafter cal led the 
second plan while the second NDP developed under the military was the 
1975-1980 plan, hereinafter called the third plan. 
The military's economic goals and methods through which the regime 
expected to achieve such goals as listed in the above plans will be ex-
amined in order to assess the economic performance of the military. Spe-
cifically, their housing program (social welfare) and their agricultural 
and industrial program (general economic policy) will be examined. Em-
phasis will be on the second plan because it is the one plan that had 
every chance to succeed as wi 11 be shown below. 
The years 1966-1970 were spent in crises including the Civil War, 
and in 1975, the Gowen administration was terminated after it had had 
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ample opportunity to fully operationalize the second plan. In 1976, the 
Murtala administration was terminated with his assassination ir· February. 
By then, the third plan (1975-1980) had been seriously impeded on two 
separate occasions--the ousting of Gowen, its mentor, and the assassina-
1 
tion of Murtala who had pledged to implement it after he made some moder-
ations. It was therefore a mutilated third NDP that Obasanjo carried on 
to 1979. Therefore, one could argue that the third plan did not stand a 
chance of being successfully implemented. The second plan did not suffer 
any of the above setbacks but instead had the advantage of abundant capi-
tal. The "oil boom" earnestly took off in 1970 in Nigeria and by 1974, 
Nigerian production represented 3.5 percent of total world production 
and 6.7 percent of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
output--OPEC accounting for 50 percent of world output. By November, 
1974, Nigeria produced twenty-four barrels per day (bpd) of its high pric-
ed oil which by then was priced even higher as a result of the fourfold 
OPEC oil price hike following the Yom Kippur War of 1973. In other words 
"money was no problem" in the implementation of the second plan (Arnold, 
p. 51). 
The second plan was, however, improperly formulated. Unlike the 
1962-1968 plan which was formulated only after extensive consultation be-
tween the federal and regional governments for purposes of overall coor-
dination, there was very little consultation during the formulation of 
the second plan. It was a plan from 11above"--a misnomer in ecqnomic 
planning which is usually from 11 below. 11 It was a federal goverlnment 
plan. By 1970, the states were barely three years old and lacKed the 
wherewithal to undertake the task of economic planning. 
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It has also been suggested that the second plan was formulated as a 
sort of alibi. That is, once the military informally decided against go-
ing back to the barracks after the civil war, new goals had to be set, 
the achievement of which necessitated the continued stay of the military 
in power. This was in order to prevent the erosion of the regime 1 s rai-
son d 1etre. This suggestion is said to be clearly evident in Gowon•s 
1970 independence day (October 1) broadcast (Olorunsla, p. 64). The 
point is that although the second plan had every chance to succeed, it 
had a false premise of conception. 
The five princfpal objectives which the military supposedly set out 
to accomplish through the second plan were outlined as follows (Second 
National Development Plan): the creation of 
1. a united, strong, and self-reliant nation 
2. a great and dynamic economy 
3. a just and egalitarian society 
4. a land of full and equal opportunity for all citizens 
5. a free and democratic society (p. 32). 
A hierarchy of priorities was set and agriculture, industry, trans-
portation, and manpower development were seemingly given top priority. 
Next were social services and utilities (electricity, communication, wa-
ter, etc.). The thirdweredefense and security which though third, sup-
posedly, was referred to as a 11special class.'' As shall be seen, 11 the 
first of these priorities became the last and the last the first. 11 
A second look at the above prioritie~ reveals that they are all re-
lated and can be reduced to the following--the creation of a 11 just and 
egalitarian society and a land full of equal opportunities for all citi-
zens. 11 The Nigerian society which the military sought to turn egalitari-
an etc. was (still is) one which contained a pyramidal allocation of 
privileges. A small group on top of the pyramid consisting of merchants, 
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transporters, academicians, higher civil servants, company executives, 
and of course army officers live in quality residential areas called 
Government Reservation Areas (GRA) at subsidized rents with abundant ac-
cess to medical and various other social amenities. Then there are 
clerks, semi-skilled and self-employed artisans who live in overcrowded 
urban areas with little access to social amenities. At the bottom of 
the ladder are those who are virtually just managing to 11exist'' in the 
rural areas in abject poverty on subsistence level. 
In order for such a society to become egalitarian, there is the need 
to reduce the government provided fringe benefits of the elite, better 
the lot of the generality of Nigerians and to pursue a policy of balanc-
ed development among the various communities. An examination of the im-
plementation of the second plan reveals hardly any evidence that the 
military really meant to better the lot of the generality of Nigerians 
or if they meant to, that they did. 
The capital available for the implementation of the second plan was 
an astronomical $4 bi 11 ion for the four years (1970-1974) compared to the 
figure of $286 mill ion for the six years of the first development plan 
(Dudley, p. 234). Though there was an increase of almost 2,000 percent 
in the amount of capital available to implement the second planl compared 
to the first, the former showed less than 10 percent increase in budget-
I 
ary allocation to any crucial segment of economic life. On the contrary, 
some important segments suffered decreases, e.g., social welfare suffer-
ed a . I percent decrease while town/country planning suffered a 4.3 per-
cent budgetary decrease. When one takes into account the spiraling in-
flationary wave triggered by the OPEC oil price hike in 1973, even the in-
creases we are talking about here were actually nullified (see Table IV). 
Socia 1- Economic 
Education 








Total (Pub 1 i c 
Sector) 
TABLE IV 
A COMPARISON OF THE FIRST AND SECOND 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PLANS 
1970-74 Plan 1962-68 Plan 
N Mi 11 ion As % of Total N Mi 11 ion As % of 
286,380 27.9 165,167 24.4 
138,893 13.5 69,763 10.3 
53,811 5.2 17,076 2.5 
10,931 1.1 3,662 0.5 
11 ,973 1.2 8,662 1.3 
19,075 1.9 41 '746 6.2 
51,696 5.0 24,258 3.6 
1,025,369 100.0 676,800 100.0 
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Total 
The total socio-economic budget showed an increase of only 3.5 per-
cent. The educatioo, health, information, and water/sewerage budgets 
increased by only 3.2, 2.7, 9.6, and 1.4 percent, respectively. 
Labor and social welfare sufferedaO.l percent decrease; likewise, 
town and country planning suffered a 4.3 percent decrease. 
Source: V. A. Olorunsola, Societal Reconstruction in Two African States 
(Washington, D.C., 1977), p. 66. 
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Though the second plan acknowledged housing as a gigantic,problem, 
I 
the total expenditure established to deal with it throughout t~e entire 
plan period was only $45 million out of the available capital Jf $4 bil-
lion. A study of urban versus rural investment of the military govern-
ment in the second plan shows not 11social justice•• but injustice for peo-
ple in the rural areas. Only 11 percent of total government electrifica-
tion was in the rural areas and 84 percent of the health investment bene-
fited urban areas where the elite live. Water supply to Nigerians living 
in rural areas was also given low priority (see Table V). 
Althoughthemilitary declared that agriculture was one of the high-
est priority areas, this was in fact not so. The second plan represented 
a return to the colonial policy of producing raw materials for ·overseas 
markets. No attempts were made to locally process cocoa, palm oil, or 
groundnut for overseas and domestic markets. This negated the goal to 
create ••a self-reliant country!• as a country must be at least self-suffi-
cient in food production to be self-reliant. Agricultural research was 
woefully funded. In fact, two-thirds of the twelve states allocated ab-
solutely nothing to agricultural research and even the federal government 
allocated only a meager 4.4 percent of the agricultural budget tore-
search. Yet the military had expressed desire to increase the production 
of the farmer through the development of cheap, simple, hand-operated or 
small motor-powered or animal drawn implements! The fact that there was 
very little consultation during the formulation of the second plan had 
by now caught up with the military (see Table VI). 
The industrial policy of the military as enunciated in the second 
plan was to say the least self-contradictory. On the one hand, there 
was to be even development and fair distribution of industries in all 
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TABLE V 
URBAN VERSUS RURAL INVESTMENT IN 1970-1974 PLAN 
Total 
Planned Urban Rural 
Investment Investment Investment 
N Mi 11 ion N Mi 11 ion % N Mi 11< ion % 
Industry 86. 1 77.7 91.2 8.4 9.8 
Electricity 45.3 40.3 89.0 5.0 11.0 
Water and 
Sewerage 51.7 42.2 71.6 9.5 18.4 
Town and 
Country 
Planning 19. 1 18.0 94.3 1;. 1 5.7 
Education 138.9 98.4 70.9 40.5 29. 1 
Health 53.8 45.2 84.0 8.6 16.0 
Social 
Welfare 12.0 11.0 91.7 r.o 8.3 
Total 406.9 322.8 8l.R 74.1 18.2 
Source: v. A. Olorunsola, Societal Reconstruction in Two African States 















% of Tota 1 ~·: 
* Percent 
TABLE VI 
1970-1974 PLAN FOR PROPOSED EXPENDITURE ON SOME 
IMPORTANT AGRICULTURAL PROJECTS (NM) 
Food Export Extension 
Crops Crops Research Services 
4.362 17.000 
0.442 0.100 2.026 
2.299 5.480 1.160 0.550 
0.709 6.927 
0.359 0.706 1.110 
1. 500 0.245 0.240 0.315 
1.673 1. 989 0.172 0.226 
0.266 0.185 1.560 
0. 370 0.093 1. 373 
0.216 1.301 
1.480 0.589 0.181 0.071 
0.683 2.231 2.267 
z.ot'l~ 3.735 1.165 
9. 790 11.100 4.610 24.780 



















Source: v. A. Olorunsola, Societal Reconstruction in Two African States 
(Washington, D. C., 1977)' p. 71. 
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parts of the country and on the other industries were to be cited on the 
basis of economic considerations. This was contradictory because the 
citing of industries based on 11purely economic consideration 11 favors the 
urban areas over the rural because the former have the infrastructure--
the sine qua~ for the location of industries--already in place. The 
military lacked the willingness to invest in the infrastructur~l develop-
ment of the rural areas which is a negation of their expressed intention 
to evenly develop the country. 
While the above crucial and productive sectors of the economy were 
being starved of funds and attention, the nonproductive class of defense 
and security received abundant budgetary allocations at a time when the 
country was facing neither an external nor an internal threat to secur-
ity. More wi 11 be said about the unjustified allocations to defense and 
security in peacetime when we turn to look at the third plan period of 
1975 to 1980. 
So obvious was the military 1 s failure that they had to admit it them-
selves. The first progress report on the plan issued by the government 
acknowledged failure in agricultural development. It was reported that 
there had been stagnation in food production consequent upon which food 
prices had skyrocketed. This was a very significant failure because the 
agricultural industry provided (and still provides) the livelihood for 
an overwhelming majority of Nigerians (West Africa, p. 719). 
Agricultural development had been declining under the civilians but 
with the advent of the military and bouyant oil revenues, agriculture 
suffered a near total neglect. Oil exports rose in value from $262 mil-
lion in 1969 to $5,365.7 mill ion in 1974, by which year oi 1 contributed 
96.8 percent of Nigeria 1 s external earnings (Dudley, p. 116). On the 
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other hand, there occurred a 41.3 percent drop in the total area under 
active agricultural cultivation--from 18.8 million to 11.05 million hec-
tares. As a result, whereas Nigeria used to export cocoa, palm produce, 
groundnuts, cotton, rubber, etc., by 1975, Nigeria became an importer of 
palm produce and groundnuts while cocoa and rubber exports declined con-,. 
siderably (Dudley, p. 112). There occurred an ironical shift in Nigeria's 
·import-export structure. Cocoa which accounted for 19.9 percent of to-
tal exports (by value) in 1962 fell to a mere 3.3 percent in 1975. Where-
as Nigeria had been self-sufficient in rice, by 1976 60 million kilos of 
rice had to be imported. Whereas Nigeria was once the largest exporter 
of vegetable oils and groundnuts in the world, in 1976 1002 tonnes of 
vegetable oil and 14,000 tonnes of groundnuts had to be imported. Against 
this background, crude oil exports rose from 9.9 percent in 1962 to 92.7 
percent of total Nigerian exports in 1975 (see Table VI 1). 
A number of reasons help explain the above state of affairs. The 
farmers were left on their subsistence level of operation (except for 
the very few mechanized farms of the privileged elite), there was not 
nearly enough agricultural extension services and the illiterate farmers 
were too poor to afford the technical hardware and fertilizer to improve 
production. To top it all, very poor prices were offered for the crops 
that the farmers managed to produce. The net result of the neglect of 
agriculture was that whereas the sector was the mainstay of the Nigerian 
economy at independence and contributed 65.9 percent of the GOP then, 
after suffering nine years of military mismanagement, agriculture contri-
buted only 24.5 percent to the GDP in 1975. 
It cannot be said that the military shifted emphasis from agricul-
ture to another equally crucial sector of the Nigerian economy--to 
Item 
Crude 0 i 1 
Cocoa 
Palm Oi 1 
TABLE VII 
PERCENT OF TOTAL BY VALUE OF NIGERIA 1 S 
EXPORTS, SELECTED YEARS 
1962 1967 1971 
9.9 29.8 73.4 
19.8 22.6 11.0 
5.3 0.5 0.3 
Palm Kerne 1 10.0 3.2 2.0 
Groundnuts 19.2 14.6 1.9 
Groundnut 0 i 1 3.6 3.0 1.0 
Groundnut Cake 1.4 1.7 0.5 
Raw Cotton 3.5 2.7 0.8 
Rubber 6.7 2.6 1.0 
Tin/Metal Ore 4. 1 5.4 1.8 
Others 16.5 13.7 6.3 















Figures for hides and skins, and timber and timber 
products were omitted in order to show comparability with 
the 1962-1971 data. 
Source: B. Dudley, An Introduction to Nigerian Government 




industry. Industrial output which accounted for 7 percent of the GOP in 
1965/1966 fiscal year accounted for only 10.2 percent of the GOP in the 
1974/1975 fiscal year--a percentage ' increase of only 3.2 in ni~e years 
inspite of the huge difference in avai'lable capital noted elsewhere in 
this study which could have been wisely invested to obtain better re-
sults (Dudley, p. 113). 
At the expiration of the third NDP period in 1980, the federal gov-
ernment was in a position to spend two times as much 11oil boom'' money 
in one day as the civilian government spent in one month twenty years 
ago, yet industry did not fare any better then than it did during the 
previous plan period. The Nigerian Enterprises and Promotion Decree 
(NEPD) was promulgated in 1972 to enable Nigerians gain control of the 
commanding heightsofthe economy. NEPD required that Nigerians own at 
least 40 percent equity-share of companies operated by foreigners. The 
percentage equity share was increased i~ 1977 to 60 percent through the 
instrument of the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree number three--
the so-called lndigenization Decree of that same year. 
Though the indigenization decrees broadened the pattern of owner-
ship in major financial and industrial enterprises, they left foreign 
interests concentrated in various firms and therefore left de facto con-
trol of the enterprises still in the hands of non-Nigerians. Moreover, 
those Nigerians who were able to buy the shares were the already 11 high 
ups 11 in society. 110ne need not therefore dispute the statement of one 
of the goals of (the military) which was to create 'a land of bright and 
full opportunities for all citizens' except to make the qualification 
that in place of the phrase 'for all citizens,' one should read 'for the 
few' which is perhaps a more palatable way of denying one other goal of 
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(the military)--the creation of a 1 just and egalitarian society 111 (Dud-
ley, p. 273). 
A statement released in 1978 by the Nigerian Manufacturer 1 s Associa-
tion which groups together all Nigerian industrialists provides a fair 
judgment of the military 1 s industrial policy. 11 Nigerian manufacturers 
are besetwith a host of problems such as frequent power cuts, inadequate 
water supply, shortage of trained manpower and nonavailability of facil-
ities for additional working capital which not only results in reduced 
production but also discourages expansion of existing plants (Dudley, p. 
242). 
The social welfare (housing) sector of the economy did not fare any 
better. The military proposed to build 60,000 housing units during the 
third plan period which were to be sold to the low-income public on an 
owner-occupier basis. Loans were to be made available by the Federal 
Mortgage Bank with eight percent interest. An analysis of the proposal 
shows that the first year repayment on the loan of $45,000 (the average 
cost of the houses) alone at the interest rate of eight percent is far 
greater than the total annual wage of the highest paid low-income earner 
in the Nigerian public service, that is, someone on Salary Grade Level 8 
who is at the top of the scale for their grade level. The housing pro-
posal turned out to be another extra feather in the already comfortable 
nest of the Nigerian elite. Privileged Nigerians, including army offi-
cers, took possession of such housing units, rented them out and continu-
ed to live in government subsidized housing themselves. 
The military promulgated a number of rent decrees which were sup-
posed to control rent in the urban areas but actually led to between 33 
and 50 percent increase in rent. Most residents were public servants 
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whose rent is subsidized by state agencies like universities and corpora-
tions. The rent decrees simply legalized the transfer of public funds 
into the private pockets of the elite who owned such rented buildings. 
For example, following the 1976 Rent Decree, the rent bill for the staff 
of the University of lbadan rose by 50 percent to over $2 million. One 
of the houses so rented belonged to the then Head of State, General Oba-
sanjo and rent on it rose from $6000 to $8000 (Dudley, p. 323). 
During the third plan period, the military attempted to do some-
thing about the deteriorating agricultural sector to no avail. In 1976, 
the high cost but ineffective Operation Feed the Nation (OFN) was launch-
ed. Eleven River Basin Authorities were established for the irrigation 
of integrated farming schemes that were created. The schemes failed due 
to a dearth of skilled manpower, that is, professional and technical per-
sonnel, senior administrative/managerial staff which were not planned 
for. Efforts made to provide fertilizers, mechanical aids, and credit 
facilities to small farmers with unmechanized farms benefited the large 
mechanized farm owners who. invariably were the already privileged in so-
ciety. Small farm lands were actually taken over by the elite--the up-
per ranks of the armed forces and others who had access to bank loans 
and other agricultural credit and could therefore own and operate large-
scale mechanized farms. At this juncture, it is to be noted that at 
least seven of the highest ranking officers of the Obasanjo regime re-
tired or were retired to start a new career in large-scale farming on 
estates that were acquired while they were still in office. 
Again, like the case with the second plan, while crucial sectors of 
the economy were starved of funds and inadequately managed, the military 
oligarchy and their accomplices siphoned away millions of public funds 
into private coffers via several means including the inordinate infla-
tion of the defense and security (peacetime) budget. 
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In the 1979/1980 fiscal year which recorded the highest expenditure 
on health and education of our time frame (1966-1979), per capi'ta expen-
diture on education and health was only ~4.19 and Nl .1, respectively! 
The defense and security per capita expenditure was almost twice that of 
education and health put together--N8. 17, but expenditure per soldier 
came to N3476. The defense figure (~3476) represents a 3~ percent rise 
in the per capita expenditure from the 1974 figure of ~2518, much of 
which was not spent on armaments but salary increases and fringe bene-
fits accruing to army officers (Dudley, p. 264). The corruption and 
waste were carried on in other areas as well. 
Approximately N800m was poured into the collosal jamboree in waste 
that was called the World Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture 
(FESTAC) justtoprovide entertainment for the various foreign 11big men 11 
and the Nigerian elite. FESTAC had no bearing whatsoever with reference 
to the issue of elevating the pitiful economic condition of ordinary Ni-
gerians. Also, in 1972, a Public Service Review Commission was set up 
by the military and chaired by Chief Jerome Udoji to recommend ways to 
improve. the efficiency of the Public Service. The Commission reported 
two years later and recommended the employment of modern techniques of 
management science, for example, 11management by objectives, 11 11project 
management, 11 etc. but instead, the military paid out a meaningless and 
wasteful nine months arrears of salary--the so-called Udoji ~ward~--to 
every employee in the public sector. This was probably the military•s 
way of cushioning the bombshell concerning the postponement of the re-
turn to civilian government that was announced on October 1, 1974. The 
Udoji arrears amounted to over NSOO million lavished on only 5.5 percent 
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of the population to the exclusion of private sector employees, rural 
I 
I 
farmers, and the self-employed. Needless to say, the Udoji awards sent 
the inflationary rate, which was already one of the highest in lthe world 
at 28 percent, to over 40 percent. The price index, which was :.150.6 in 
1970 (1960 = 100), was up to 348.2 in 1976 because of the awards and the 
differential between the average urban wage, which was already twice the 
average rural wage by 1974, was doubled due to the awards (Arnold, p. 77). 
Gowan toured extensively on "personal diplomacy" squandering Nige-
ria's funds as though they were in his personal bank account for objec-
tives that were not readily perceivable to be in Nigeria's interest. For 
example, Gowan promised to pay salaries of all Grenadian civil servants 
for two months following his visit to the Island country early in 1975. 
Also, the military under Gowan committed Nl9.5 million toward the expan-
sian of the Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation when she was al-
ready in technical partnership with Britain, Canada, and India through 
which a lot more technical expertise stood to be acquired (Dudley, p. 
289). 
bad 
Corruption, waste, and/ethics go together. Thus when on October 1, 
1974, the military reneged on their promise to return power to civilians 
by 1976, this was corruption of a sort. The reasons the military gave 
were not taken seriously; instead it was widely believed that the mili-
tary simply wanted to stay in power so they could continue to corruptly 
enrich themselves. The military governors and members of the executive 
councils used their positions and glaringly and corruptly enriched them-
selves as they wished, having no constituents to conciliate and no elec-
torate to be accountable to (see Appendix A). 
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Thus, the military used the oil boom not to put Nigeria in a posi-
tion to take off industrially but to 11foster the growth and spread of 
commercial capitalism enabling the military hierarchy and thei~ civilian 
aides to emerge as the new dominant property-owning 1class 1 in.the soci-
I 
etyl 1--the main losers being the 11 John Citizens 11 in the rural areas and 
on the streets (Dudley, p. 120). 
CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
It can be concluded from the preceding that the military have been 
mere usurpers of power--as opposed to corrective agents--in Nigerian 
politics. This is borne out by the performance of the military inoffice 
vis a vis two of Nigeria 1 s most important problems or needs, namely, the 
integration of the multiplicity of ethno-cultural groups in Nigeria into 
one nation and the socio-economic development of Nigeria to where Nigeri-
ans would enjoy material prosperity. 
As far as the problem of national integration is concerned, military 
intervention led not tothe integration of Nigeria, but to civil war and 
almost to the dismemberment of the country altogether. The creation of 
states in 1967 by the military, which some have cited as a significant 
contributionofthe military to Nigerian unity, was actually a tactical 
ploy in the struggle for power between Gowon and Ojukwu. Thirdly, the 
tribal, sectional, and ethnic nature of party politics in the second re-
public proves that over a decade of military rule did not do much qood. 
Economically, military rule in Nigeria led to the neglect of agri-
culture and industry and the general mismanagement of the Nigerian eco-
nomy. The huge oil revenues which provided the 11 break11 needed to help 
put Nigeria on the developed map of the world were squandered on pres-
tigious but economically unproductive projects such as 11 FESTAC 11 77 while 
the military feathered their own nests to become together with their 
61 
62 
civilian aides, the new dominant property-owning 11class 11 in Nigeria. 
In the light of the failure of military rule in Nigeria, the logi-
i 
cal question that begs to be asked and answered is 11 lf not military die-
tatorship, what then? 11 How is a new 11 nation 11 to 11make it 11 eco7omically 
and otherwise? A look at how the first new nation--the United States--
made it should throw some light here. 
The United States can be rightly regarded as the first new nation 
because it was thefirstmajor colony to successfully revolt against co-
lonial rule. (The Spanish colonies to the South were to follow suit 
shortly after.) Initially, English Christian Puritans who had migrated 
from England formed the nuclei of the new nation that was to be. Soon, 
however, persons from Great Britain and all over Europe migrated to the 
Americas from different backgrounds and cultures. When eventually inde-
pendence was achieved, the new nation--the United States--was faced with 
problems of national integration and economic development, that is, how 
to integrate the various groups within its borders into a nation, and 
how to achieve substantial economic development to the place that its 
citizens would be materially prosperous. 
It took time to institutionalize common values, beliefs, and prac-
tices. In other words, it took time for an identity to be established. 
11 Countries, like people, are not handed identities at birth, but acquire 
I 
them through the arduous process of 1 growing up, 1 a process which is a 
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notoriously painful affair 11 (Lipset,/p. 1~). A revolutionary war and 
then a civil war were fought. Imperfections and unacceptable phenomena 
such as the Spoils System were eventually discarded. All these took a 
century or so and that is the crucial aspect with respect to the desires 
and efforts of new nations today--Nigeria included--who seem bent on 
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devising a "short cut to Heaven.'' It did not simply take time, however, 
but all the while a system of government--Western Democracy--was in 
place to undergird the process mentioned immediately above. 
For Nigeria then, the answer to the above question, "If not mili-
tary dictatorship, what then?" is clearly that Nigeria needs "a form of 
government in which the leaders are open to criticism, open to reason, 
open to dialogue, responsive to the yearnings of the people, accountable 
to the people, and ready to compromise when compromise there should be" 
(Okafor, p. 59). It cannot be autocratic monarchy for the bloody his-
tory of such government is reprehensible, not feudalism for its age is 
past, not communist despotism because that negates the very principles 
of natural law which guarantees human freedom and fulfillment. Besides, 
the moral-cum cultural values which the African has consistently upheld 
are the exact opposite of those accepted by communist totalitarianism. 
The most applicable option is Western Democracy. 
The view is widely held that Africa in general is "done for" due to 
the fact that "tribalism is the stock-in-trade of the African milieu." 
The fact, however, is that tribalism has been and is sti 11 to be found 
in other parts of the world (although its effects have been largely nul-
lified) and such cultures have continued to progress. The countries of 
Europe grew from tribal beginnings. The plague of tribalism, ethnicity, 
and other forms of sectionalism have not been wiped out of that. conti-
nent. The separatists movements in parts of Europe are manifestations 
of tribalism. In Spain, Basque and Catalan nationalists are demanding 
autonomy. Extremists of the Gaelic peoples of Great Britain--the Scots, 
Welsh, and Irish are not content under English lordship. In France, 
the Breton separatists prefer their own black and white flag to France's 
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tricolor flag. In Belgium, the Walloons and the Flemings have bickered 
from time immemorial. 
It is unquestionable that tribalism has not had the kind of adverse 
effect on these societies that it has has on Africa. The reason has been 
that Western Democracy has been able to ameliorate the differences caus-
ed by tribal leaninqs or agitations in the former. The story should not 
be any different in Africa. 
Western Democracy will through its political, social, economic, edu-
cational, and moral operations provide for the security, liberty, and 
fulfillment of the individual and therefore loosen tribalism 1 s grip on 
and its appeal in the African perimeter. Democracy creates a society 
where men have equal access as much as is possible to the opportunities, 
rewards, and benefits of the social environment. In Nigeria, it should 
provide the avenue for healthy competition, untarnished by hereditary 
(feudalistic)/totalitarian (military) privileges which would release the 
creative energies of all groups for the purpose of exploiting the wealth 
of the nation for the good of all. 
Democracy creates a society 11where members of diverse tribes and 
ethnic groups live in a national cohesive whole enjoying an organic re-
lati0nship without hate and without suspicion, with each man relying for 
success not on the dehumanizing incitement to sectional hatred and tri-
bal feelings and ostracisms but rather on his ability to give proof of 
his effectiveness and potentiality for good 11 (Okafor, p. 64). 
In order to attain rapid material development, Nigeria desperately 
needs peace. Democracy is a better guarantor of peace and stability 
than any other form of government--certainly than military dictatorship. 
The political framework of democracy gives power to the people and 
grants freedom of expression, freedom of association, and other liber-
1 
ties. Violence and democracy are not compatible concepts. Thdse (the 
I 
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military) who in the name of tomorrow's 11 peace 11 inflict men and society 
I 
with violence today have been proven by history, as discussed above, to 
! 
have nothin~ to offer. We disagree with Aristotle who said that benign 
dictatorship is the best form of government. Dictatorship--benign or 
military--is anachronistic. 
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APPENDIX 
Case I 
Joseph Gomwalk, Governor of Benue Plateau State. On taking office 
in May, 1967, Gomwalk was supposed to have a sum of N200 in his savings 
account and N430 in his current account. But while governor, he acquir-
ed the following: 
1. A house in Naraguta Ave., Jos valued at N70,000 
2. A block of four flats in Pankshin valued at N60,000 
3. A house rented by Voteniski (a firm of contractors in which 
the governor had an interest) for N24,000 a year 
4. Another house rented by Voteniski for N20,000 
5. Another house valued at Nl40,000 
6. 1500 (SOK) shares, 1300 (Nl.OO) shares and 910 (N20.00) shares 
in various companies, etc. 
Case II 
Governor 0. Ogbemudia of the Midwest, who acquired the following in 
office: 
1. A farminq estate 
2. A motel valued at Nl49,759 
3. Several landed properties in and outside the Midwestern state 
4. Investment in shares worth N28,940 
Case Ill 
Ukpabi Asika, Administrator of East Central State, who acquired 
while in office: 
1. A house valued at Nl20,000 
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2. An apartment in Spain in addition to other property t~ere 
3. Shares worth thousands of naira 
Source: New Nigerian, December 3, 1975. 
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